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Fiscal Multipliers in War and in Peace
David Andolfatto
Proponents of fiscal stimulus argue that government spending is needed to replace the private
spending normally lost during a recession. Estimates of the so-called fiscal multiplier based on
wartime episodes are used to support the proposition that a peacetime intervention can “stimulate”
the economy in a desirable manner. The author argues that a wartime crisis is fundamentally
different from a peacetime economic crisis. What may be desirable in war is not necessarily so in
peace. This is demonstrated formally in the context of a simple neoclassical model, which delivers
fiscal multipliers consistent with the wartime evidence. The optimal fiscal policy, whether it entails
expansion or contraction, is independent of the size of the fiscal multiplier. (JEL E6, E62)
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us that the beast of that great crisis was ultimately
slain only with the large fiscal expenditures
associated with World War II.
Current debate appears to be centered on
estimates of the so-called fiscal multiplier (see,
for example, Auerbach and Gale, 2009). The fiscal
multiplier can be defined as the answer to the
following question: If the government were to take
a dollar out of the pocketbooks of its citizens (by
way of a tax, either contemporaneous or deferred)
and spend it on something that the nation pro-
duces, by how much would domestic income rise?1
There appears to be no definitive answer to
this question. A major problem in extracting
estimates from historical data is ascertaining the
direction of causality. Much of the positive asso-
ciation between nondefense government spend-
ing and gross domestic product (GDP) may, in
particular, reflect the government’s response to
an expanding economy rather than vice versa.
For this reason, economists frequently restrict
S
hould governments attempt to 
“stimulate” the economy at the onset
of a major recession? Until recently,
the conventional wisdom has been that
discretionary fiscal policy, even if desirable in
principle, is operationally too clumsy a tool to
be used in practice. In particular, the worst of a
recession typically passes well before fiscal legis-
lation is finally implemented. For those inclined
to ascribe some role to government intervention,
smoothing the business cycle has been viewed
as a task best left to the monetary authority to
address by way of an accommodative interest
rate policy.
The recent U.S. recession, however, appears
not to be a run-of-the-mill downturn. The labor
market continues to show evidence of distress;
and with nominal interest rates on short-term U.S.
Treasuries close to zero, conventional monetary
policy appears to have run out of ammunition.
These conditions remind some people of Great
Depression economics. In the popular media, pro-
ponents of fiscal stimulus are fond of reminding
1 The intervention is implicitly assumed to be “temporary.”
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government defense spending are reasonably
interpreted as independent of macroeconomic
developments. Estimates of defense spending
multipliers commonly range between 0.5 and 1.0
(see Barro and Redlick, 2009; and Hall, 2009).
How should these estimated wartime multi-
pliers be interpreted and, in particular, what can
they tell us about the desirability of a peacetime
fiscal stimulus? Interpretation requires theory;
and here, I choose to address these questions in
the context of a simple neoclassical model. I
assume that society values government purchases.
Moreover, I assume that the government manages
its purchases efficiently in response to changes
in the environment. The model is capable of gen-
erating fiscal multipliers in a range consistent
with the wartime evidence.
Whether fiscal stimulus is warranted or not
depends on the event triggering the crisis: The
effect of a wartime event on the economic environ-
ment is fundamentally different from that of a
recessionary event. The model explains why a
fiscal stimulus is welfare improving for a wartime
event and why a similar policy is likely to be wel-
fare reducing for a recessionary event. Moreover,
these welfare results apparently have little, if
any, correlation with the actual size of the fiscal
multiplier.
A SIMPLE NEOCLASSICAL MODEL
Consider an economy populated by a repre-
sentative household with preferences defined
over three types of goods: private consumption
(c), home production (l), and government spend-
ing (g). Under the usual innocuous assumptions,
these preferences can be represented by a utility
function U￿c,l,g￿. With some loss of generality,
I impose the following restrictions on these 
preferences: 
(1)     
where the functions u, h, and v are all increasing
and weakly concave.2 The parameter 0 < ʸ < 1
measures the relative weight that a household
attaches to government spending (g) vis-à-vis
U c l g u c h l g ,￿ ,￿ , ( ) = − ( ) ( )+ ( )    + ( ) 1 θ θν
private goods (c,l) in its preferences. In what fol-
lows, I model the arrival of war as an exogenous
increase in ʸ (an event where society now places
greater value on government spending relative to
other goods).
Households have a limited amount of time,
which I normalize to unity. Assume that this time
is allocated across two competing uses: employ-
ment (n) and home production (l). This implies
a time constraint,
(2)     
Assume that time devoted to employment n
generates GDP equal to zn, where z > 0 is a param-
eter that indexes labor productivity. The GDP is
divided in some manner between private con-
sumption and government spending; this implies
a resource constraint,
(3)     
So far, there is nothing “neoclassical” about
this setup except that I have chosen to be explicit
about household preferences and resource con-
straints. This model society, like societies in
reality, faces a basic and fundamental problem:
how to allocate scarce resources across competing
uses. In my model society, the problem is rela-
tively simple. First, how should society divide
its scarce time across employment and home
production? (This determines GDP.) Second, how
should society divide GDP across consumption
and government spending? (This determines the
expenditure components of GDP.) The real debate
in macroeconomic theory involves explaining (i)
the process by which a society solves such prob-
lems and (ii) whether the solutions are in any
well-defined sense “efficient.”
In what follows, I abstract from processes and
focus on outcomes. I begin by assuming that,
conditional on functional forms u, h, and ʽ and
parameters ʸ and z, the outcome (c,g,l,n) is the
solution to the problem of maximizing equation
n l + = 1.
c g zn + = .
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2 Implicit in this formulation is that the household makes no dis-
tinction between defense- and nondefense-related government
spending. It would be of some interest to relax this assumption, as
doing so may affect some of the conclusions that follow. Keep in
mind that such distinctions are rarely, if ever, made in Keynesian
models.(1) subject to the resource constraints in equa-
tions (2) and (3). In mathematical terms, one can
think of a benevolent social planner solving the
following problem:
(4)     
Denote the solution to this problem n*￿ʸ,z￿ and
g*￿ʸ,z￿. This implies c* = zn* – g* and l* = 1 – n*.
Let y* = zn* denote GDP.
The solution described above is, by construc-
tion, efficient in the sense that it maximizes social
welfare subject to resource constraints. By the
second welfare theorem the same solution can be
implemented as a competitive equilibrium. In
other words, both planner and competitive mar-
kets are equally efficient mechanisms here. Focus  -
ing attention on the efficient outcome is, I think,
a good place to start, as it serves as a useful bench-
mark. Using simple calculus, the solution ￿n*,g*￿
is described fully by the following two restrictions:
(5)     
(6)     
Interpret condition (5) as follows: One addi-
tional unit of employment generates z units of
output. At the margin, this additional output is
valued by the marginal utility of consumption
u′. Hence, zu′ represents the marginal benefit of
employment. The term h′ represents the marginal
benefit of home production—that is, the marginal
cost of employment. Efficiency dictates that the
marginal benefit and cost of employment be equal.
Condition (6) may be interpreted analogously in
terms of the marginal benefit and cost of govern-
ment spending.
I want to examine how ￿n*,g*￿ depends on the
parameters ￿ʸ,z￿. I begin by considering the special
case in which h is linear, so that h′￿l￿ = ʺ > 0.
Roughly speaking, this implies that households
find it easy to substitute their time across employ-
ment and home production. Assume that u′′,ʽ′′< 0.




u zn g h n g
,￿
. 1 1 − ( ) − ( )+ − ( )    + ( ) { } ʸ ʸʽ
zu zn g h n ′ − ( ) = ′ − ( )
∗ ∗ ∗ 1
1− ( ) ′ − ( ) = ′( )
∗ ∗ ∗ ʸ ʸʽ u zn g g .
(7)     
(8)     
War...
Now consider the effect of an exogenous
increase in ʸ, which I interpret as a war event that
threatens national security. From equation (8),
we have
This result seems sensible: A national security
threat dictates that the government divert resources
toward national defense. Note that condition (8)
implies that c* = zn* – g* remains constant. As g*
is required to increase, this implies that employ-
ment n* must rise (at the expense of home produc-
tion). Formally, we have
The “multiplier” in this model can be calcu-
lated as dy*/dg*, which here is equal to 1. It is clear
that the increase in government spending is wel-
fare improving, but this result has nothing to do
with the size of the multiplier. In particular, the
result would still hold if the multiplier were less
than 1 (a property that would emerge if h′′< 0,
for example). In this latter case, private consump-
tion would decline along with home production.
These are sacrifices that society is willing to bear
in the face of a national security threat that requires
that resources be diverted toward government
spending.
...and Peace
Consider next the effect of an exogenous
decrease in z, which I interpret as a recessionary
event that lowers labor productivity. From equa-
tion (8), we have
zu zn g ′ − ( ) =
∗ ∗ κ
1− ( ) = ′( )
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that condition (7) implies zu′￿c*￿ = ʺ. Hence, 
dc*/dz = –u′￿c*￿/￿zu′′￿c*￿￿ > 0. Since y* = c* + g*,
it follows that GDP increases in response to an
increase in z.
The model suggests that the government
should adjust its purchases in line with chang-
ing business conditions. As labor productivity
improves, so should government purchases to
meet the added “demand” for government services
created by an expanding economy. The same
logic works in reverse when labor productivity
deteriorates.
What is the fiscal multiplier in this model?
To answer this question, fix g at some arbitrary
level (possibly g*). Conditional on this g (and the
prevailing z), the efficient level of GDP y ˆ = zn ˆ
satisfies zu′￿y ˆ – g￿ = ʺ. The fiscal multiplier is given
by dy ˆ/dg = 1, which is independent of z. When h
is concave, it is easy to show that the fiscal multi-
plier takes the more general form, 
So, in general, theory suggests that the size
of the fiscal multiplier depends on business con-
ditions, as parameterized here by the labor pro-
ductivity parameter z. If the functions u and h
are quadratic (or approximately so), then the mul-
tiplier is a decreasing function of z. This suggests
that the effect of fiscal stimulus on GDP is weaker
during a recession than it is during an expansion.
Intuitively, inducing the private sector to exert
greater effort in a low-productivity environment
has less bang for the buck.
But should one really care whether the fiscal
multiplier is high or low? Interestingly, the model
here suggests that government purchases should
be procyclical (in fact, this is a general property
of the data). An “exogenous” deviation from this
optimal policy may stabilize GDP, but any such
deviation from the optimal policy will be welfare
reducing regardless of the size of the multiplier.
Caveats
The conclusions previously stated are based
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too much significance to these results. It is worth-
while to reflect on the key assumptions. The first
key assumption is that society somehow manages
to allocate scarce resources in an efficient manner
in response to exogenous changes in the physical
environment. The second key assumption is that
recession is triggered by an exogenous decline in
factor productivity.
Some may object that the first assumption is
obviously violated by the existence of unemploy-
ment. This is a misguided criticism. There is, in
fact, no theoretical justification for the proposition
that the efficient level of unemployment should
be equal to zero and/or be invariant to business
conditions (see, for example, Andolfatto, 1996).
Structural changes are normal in any dynamic
economy and job search is necessary for the
process of worker reallocation. Of course, the
“equilibrium” level of unemployment may not
be efficient. On the other hand, there is no a priori
reason to believe that any given level of unemploy-
ment is inefficient either.
Regardless of whether the level of unemploy-
ment is efficient, models that explicitly incorporate
the phenomenon of unemployment may deliver
very different implications for the size of the fiscal
multiplier (see, for example, Monacelli, Perotti,
and Trigari, 2009). Even when this is the case, how-
ever, the size of the multiplier should not be con-
fused with the appropriateness or desirability of
fiscal stimulus policy.
The more objectionable assumption, in my
view, is that recessions are triggered by an
exogenous decline in factor productivity. While
measured factor productivity is, in fact, highly
procyclical, much of its movement is likely
endogenous. I prefer to think of z in the model
as indexing the private sector’s forecast of future
return to current investment (including job
recruiting activities)—what Beaudry and Portier
(2006) call “news.” It is not implausible to imag-
ine that these forecasts vary substantially and at
high frequency in accordance with the arrival of
new information for all types of events (including
future fiscal policy).
A Competing View
There are, of course, many competing views
of the business cycle. Space does not permit an
Andolfatto
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comment on one view that seems unduly influ-
ential in policy circles and in the popular media.
The hypothesis in question is rooted in a theory
taught for generations in university economic
principles courses.
The basic idea rests on the premise that the
level of GDP is determined by society’s willingness
to spend, and that this willingness—at least on the
part of the private sector—is determined primarily
by inexplicable psychological factors (“animal
spirits”). The more people spend, the more they
will produce to meet this demand. According to
this view, a recession is not characterized by any
fundamental change in the structure of the econ-
omy (the parameter z in the model here). Instead,
it is triggered by a sudden wave of pessimism that
leads to a decline in “aggregate demand.”
If one adopts the view that government spend-
ing is close to a perfect substitute for private
spending, then the implied policy prescription
seems clear enough. In particular, if a recession
is triggered by a lack of private sector spending,
then why not have the government step in and
replace the missing spending?
This line of thinking is evident in the op-ed
sections of many newspapers. One prominent
example is the view expressed by Krugman (2009)
in a New York Times article explaining why the
United States recently avoided another Great
Depression. The answer, evidently, is the different
role played by the government this time around:
Probably the most important aspect of the
government’s role in this crisis isn’t what it
has done, but what it hasn’t done: unlike the
private sector, the federal government hasn’t
slashed spending as its income has fallen...this
has helped support the economy in its time of
need, in a way that didn’t happen back in 1930,
when federal spending was a much smaller
percentage of GDP.
The problem with this argument is not that it
is necessarily wrong. The problem is that it is
frequently portrayed as an incontrovertible truth.
First, it is not true that the federal government
“slashed spending” in the early 1930s (see
Wheelock, 2010, in this issue).3 But even more
Andolfatto
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3 According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis/U.S. Census Bureau,
real per capita federal government purchases increased each year
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Figure 1
GDP and Federal Government Outlays and Receipts
SOURCE: Historical Statistics of the United States.important, this view does not explain how decade-
long depressions were somehow avoided before
the 1930s, when the federal government was even
smaller (see Garrett, Kozak, and Rhine, 2010, in
this issue), as shown in Figure 1.4
CONCLUSION
I have examined a neoclassical model in
which the government is required to take an active
role in managing its purchases. A wartime event
dictates expansion of government services (e.g.,
military expenditures) at the expense of private
sector spending. The implied wartime fiscal multi-
plier is not inconsistent with available evidence.
A recessionary event dictates a contraction in
government services, roughly in line with the
necessary contraction in private expenditures.
The peacetime fiscal multiplier is likely lower
during a recession, but regardless of the size of
the multiplier, the efficient policy does not call
for a countercyclical expansion in government
spending. This is true even though the effect of
such a policy is to mitigate the decline in GDP.
A severe recession is typically characterized
by a significant, though not disastrous, decline
in GDP. But the focus on GDP hides the fact some
sectors of the economy are typically affected much
more severely than others. While the model pre-
sented here abstracts from these distributional
considerations, it is easy to incorporate them. A
model extended in this manner would not affect
the main conclusion concerning the desirability
of fiscal stimulus in a recession. At the same time,
the model might imply a positive role for a redis-
tribution policy that effectively insures unlucky
households.5 The basic message is one of sharing
the hardship of recession; it may be desirable to
have rich Peter pay poor Paul.
By way of contrast, the alternative “spend
your way to wealth” view delivers a very different
message. Notably, models based on this hypothe-
sis also abstract from distributional considerations;
that is, the imagined welfare gains from a fiscal
stimulus do not come from improved distribu-
tional consequences. Instead, the focus rests
exclusively on the size of the multiplier. If the
fiscal multiplier is greater than 1 (as commonly
asserted), then every additional dollar acquired
from the private sector and spent on government
purchases (somehow) generates more than a dollar
in average income. To put things another way,
there is no need to share the hardship of recession;
a fiscal stimulus can, in principle, make everybody
better off.
Such a message has obvious political appeal,
which perhaps explains its perennial popularity
in policy circles. I am inclined to conclude, how-
ever, that the available evidence—and available
theories to interpret such evidence—suggest
remaining circumspect in forming strong views
one way or the other.
Andolfatto
126 MARCH/APRIL 2010 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
4 I report federal government outlays instead of purchases as the
latter measure is not available in the Historical Statistics of the
United States. The two measures are likely to be highly correlated.
5 This might be true, for example, if some insurance markets are
unavailable or operate poorly.REFERENCES
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